Inference, structural rules, and information-producing actions
1
Inference, structural rules, and information-producing actions
Inference entangled with other information sources In the 1980s, several interesting nonstandard notions of consequence P C emerged, claiming to reflect features of our common sense reasoning. Circumscription in AI looked at conclusions C true only in minimal models of the premises P, with minimality measured by some comparison order for model size or predicate interpretation. General non-monotonic logics followed up on this idea, high-lighting failures of classical principles much as those found earlier in conditional logic. Structural rules, i.e., abstract properties of an inference relation , seemed a natural focus for defining 'styles of reasoning', in terms of their basic mechanics. This idea was reinforced when it turned out that very different notions of consequence, such as the resource-conscious inferences found in categorial grammar (van Benthem 1991) has illuminating sets of structural rules setting them apart from others. Likewise, van Benthem 1996 showed how deviant structural rules emerge in a natural fashion when analyzing so-called dynamic semantics, emphasizing how inference and information change are intertwined in understanding and using language. In this paper I present some further thoughts on the notion of inference emerging from all this, and its entanglement with information update and general action.
Before going to abstract structural rules and bare mechanics, however, consider an In my view, the Restaurant is about the simplest realistic logical scenario (van Benthem 2007) . Several basic informational actions take place intertwined: questions, answers, and inferences, and the setting crucially involves more than one agent. Also, actions can be analyzed for their informational content after they have taken place, but they can also be planned beforehand. Thus there is no natural border-line here between inference and actions that produce information. I would say that 'logical analysis' of even this basic scenario involves all of them -and a logical system should account explicitly for that interplay. Indeed, the same entanglement is found in Indian Logic, a tradition parallel to our western one, where various sources of obtaining information were treated on a par: including making an observation, drawing a conclusion, or asking someone! We then say the sequent P 1 , …, P k
Here P, Q, R stand for finite sequences of propositions, and A, B, C for single ones.
Dynamic inferential sequents lack the structural rules of classical consequence (van Benthem 1996, Chapter 
We must check that the following equivalence holds: One is information update, but there are many other channels for information flow. In a wide-spread traditional Indian inference schema, one is at the foot of a mountain where and the need for a basic logic of these. This theme was taken further in Barwise & van Benthem 1999 , who introduce the notion of entailment along some inter-model relation:
Definition 2 P entails C along relation R if, whenever M |=P and M R N, then N|=C.
We will discuss properties of this generalized form of inference in Section 4 below.
Remark Note that we have 'relocated the dynamics' here, as compared with Section 1.
There, we made the propositions themselves into actions transforming states. Here, however, we retain classical 'static' propositions P, C denoting properties of states, whereas the dynamics shows rather in the state-shifting transition relations R.
But for now, let's make one further move. if these relations R are so important, then why not put them explicitly into our language? This makes all the more sense, since we need not assume just one relation of interest when jumping across situations. Now, there is an obvious notation for the preceding notion, viz. the modal formula
Of course, to express sequent validity as before, this formula would have to be true in some universe of 'relevant models', whose nature is yet to be stipulated.
This modal language lies one step up from the standard austere sequent format used in formulating properties of inference relations, but one can still view it as a sort of perspicuous notation for very basic properties, and their interplay with Boolean and action structure. In the remainder of this section, we take a closer look at this modal format, under various interpretations, and with further kinds of statement. 
Action-tagged sequents and calculus of plans

R]B, C [S]D infer (A, C) [RxS] (B, D) product
Validity is easily checked in its first-order transcription:
The 'plan calculus' mentioned above (cf. These can be viewed as implications B where the plan describes a preceding successful execution of some actions from given resources. A calculus with actiontagged sequents can even be used to synthetize plans. Consider a resource proposition A and a goal proposition G. Our available premises encode subroutines available to us:
We now 'derive' G from A by the following heuristics:
G from B, C 2 B from A 3 C from B 4 B from A
Composing the associated trees required for this works out to
These examples may have shown the interest of taking a polymodal perspective on inference. Let us now state our general recommendation in this section:
The minimal modal logic is the basic structural logic for 'inference in action'!
Further uses of polymodal logic as abstract sequent calculus
To add yet more evidence for our suggestion, a full poly-modal language can express many facts beyond the above tagged sequents for entailment along a relation. Thus, existential modalities can state 'enabling principles' from inferential and computational practice:
A <R>B: A makes it possible to execute R so that B is achieved.
As another example, we show how one can use a loop modality to analyze earlier substructural rules for dynamic inference in a standard modal setting (van Benthem 1996 (van Benthem , 2003 . First, we add a modality'(a) defining the fixed-points of Section 1:
The loop language is decidable, and it has a complete axiomatization with key axioms
This language reads our earlier dynamic sequents P 1 , …, P k 4 C as modal formulaswith letters inside boxes taken as action labels: The loop language can also express complex existential properties of consequence relations beyond mere structural rules. All this reinforces our conclusion that a polymodal logic seems a natural stage for a richer abstract theory of dynamic inference. The simplest event producing information is a public announcement !P of some true proposition P (i.e., true at the actual world s in M). E.g., announcing a fact q will make you know that q -though there are more subtle phenomena in general. To reason about this informational process, we introduce a matching dynamic operator:
The principles which analyze the effects of public announcements on what agents know yield a logical system PAL which is axiomatized completely by the usual laws of epistemic logic plus the following reduction axioms:
The last axiom here is crucial, in that it reduces knowledge after an announcement to conditional knowledge which agents had before the announcement was made. This is called 'pre-encoding'. In this dynamic perspective, classical consequence from premises P to a conclusion C works as follows. Updating the current model with successive announcements !P 1 , ..., !P n leads to a new model where C is known to all agents, or even more strongly, a model where C has become common knowledge among them.
Dynamic epistemic logic, in this and more sophisticated update scenarios, provides an appropriate setting for analyzing inferences that agents make together with information which they receive from communication, observation, or other sources. This framework is more concrete than the general transition-based framework of Section 2. Still, its general properties lie close to the structural rules that we gave before in Theorem 1. This amounts to validity of the following dynamic-epistemic formula, which says that the conclusion becomes common knowledge:
Structural rules revisited: dynamic inference in communication
We can read this validity as referring to the 'Supermodel' of all epistemic models related by arbitrary announcement steps. But when modeling more realistic scenarios of conversation or enquiry, we can also relativize the preceding notions to smaller restricted families M M M of epistemic models and admissible announcements. Proof We only sketch the heart of the matter. Our crucial observation is that 
These translations lift from arbitrary modal formulas
Here is our claim, with M M M again the Supermodel consisting of all epistemic models:
This shows that satisfiable modal formulas have true substitution instances with epistemic update in the Supermodel M M M. The converse is much simpler. M M M may itself be seen as a modal model. To go from this class to a set, observe that any satisfiable modal formula at some 'world' (M, s) can also be satisfied in the set consisting of (M, s) and all its submodels, since only these can be reached via update actions.
e There are many further questions about complete logics of these update universes. But our main finding here is this. The structural rules of abstract dynamic inference are the same as those for concrete information update and the knowledge resulting from it.
Interpolation and preservation theorems
Entailment along a relation and syntactic interpolants Moving from a model (M, s)
to (M|A, s) via a true public announcement !A is just one case of an important intermodel relation which is relevant to information change: Barwise & van Benthem 1999 consider various others, moving from the above abstract modal framework to specific relations. In this context, they point out that, with suitable logical languages, such forms of generalized consequence have a special form located in interpolants of certain syntactic forms Here is a characteristic example.
Theorem 9
The following are equivalent for all first-order formulas A, B: g
In particular, then, entailment along submodels is recursively enumerable, and hence axiomatizable in principle, for first-order formulas. Moreover, as a special case, Theorem 9 implies the Los-Tarski Preservation Theorem. A first-order formula A is preserved under submodels iff A entails A along submodels, and so A has a universal interpolant C with itself, which makes C equivalent with A.
Here is another result of the same type, again combining an interpolation theorem with a preservation theorem:
Theorem 10 The following are equivalent for all first-order formulas A, B:
Proof Again, the direction from ( Entailment along a relation and matching interpolation properties have also been considered in the pioneering model-theoretic study Lindström 1966 . We refer to that paper for more systematic background to the preceding observations. But the main point of the preceding results seems to be this. One splits a general model-crossing form of logical inference into two standard consequences: one from antecedent to interpolant, and the other from interpolant to antecedent. The 'bridge' between antecedent and consequent is then provided by the invariance of the specially constructed interpolant across the relevant inter-model relation. In a slogan, General consequence equals standard consequence plus invariance.
It would be of great interest to discover the precise range of this phenomenon.
Existential variants and higher complexity Entailment via interpolants along firstorder definable relations is itself RE, and hence we are still dealing with axiomatizable consequence relations. But simple existential variations can quickly drive up complexity. One example is the situation-theoretic inference of the type 'Smoke Means Fire': "every situation where there is smoke is part of a situation where there is fire". This is the modal 'enabling' pattern A q <R>B of Section 2, now for concrete modeltheoretic relations R. Here is a result which shows the complexity effects of this.
Fact 11
The general inference notion A r r r r <model-inclusion>B is not RE.
Proof The reason is that one easily reduces first-order satisfiability to this notion.
Consider any first-order formula A, and unary predicate letter P not occurring in it. Then A is satisfiable iff the implication Here is an open problem behind many modal completeness techniques.
Open Problem 14
What is the arithmetical complexity of boosting along bisimulation for given first-order formulas 
Conclusion
This paper is an exercise in 'logical pluralism'. We have emphasized the entanglement of standard 'inference' with other informational processes such as update through assertions or observations. One can still use the familiar format of structural rules to determine the styles of reasoning which emerge then. Moving beyond that, a modal or dynamic languages provides a suitable next level for studying abstract properties of general information links. And finally, we have shown how these ideas also make sense with concrete relations between models for first-order logic and other familiar systems. They then give rise to interesting new model-theoretic issues, such as generalized interpolation theorems, and new relations of 'boosting' along model changes.
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